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LIMITATIONS ON DEFENSES UNDER 10(b): IN PARI DELICTO
AND UNCLEAN HANDS
G. Andrew Nea, Jr.*
T HE evolution 'and development of the corporate conglomerate has
been the most significant factor in the growth of twentieth century
American enterprise. Corporate growth has far outdistanced that of alterna-
tive forms of business. The purchase and sale of an increasing volume of
corporate securities has permitted management to raise impressive quanti-
ties of capital, and has allowed numerous investors to share in the profits
realized from the judicious use of their funds.
However, as the size of the American corporation has increased, manage-
ment has become increasingly isolated from the individual investor. Today,
the shareholder relates to the corporation primarily in terms of the return
it pays for the use of his dollars. Management, on the other hand, evaluates
the investor exclusively in terms of the amount of capital he is willing and
able to expend.
The separate objectives entertained by management and the investor
cause a stratification among investors according to their investment poten-
tialities. Furthermore, management may wish to accord particular advan-
tages to some investors for reasons related to the size and frequency of their
investments. It might wish to accomplish this goal by disclosing special infor-
mation to them, while withholding that information from other investors.
The favored investor might then seek to act on the privileged information
to his own benefit, but to the detriment of other shareholders, purchasers,
or sellers. To allow him an inequitable economic advantage by virtue of
inside information engenders distrust and stifles the exchange of securities
on the open market.
Historically, there were few legal impediments to this type of activity.
As late as the 1930's the only persons required to disclose information in
regard to securities transactions were those owing some fiduciary duty to the
other party. The general rule was that officers, directors, and majority
shareholders owed no such fiduciary duty to minority shareholders except
in a "special facts" situation.' However, following the stock market crash
*Member of the Virginia Bar. B.A., Washington & Lee University, 1963; LL.B.,
Richmond, 1966.1Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). In Strong a shareholder who owned three-
fourths of a corporation was held to be liable to a minority interest shareholder after
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of 1929, Congress enacted federal legislation aimed at preventing dishonest
and manipulative practices in securities transactions. Among the most sig-
nificant post-depression measures was the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,"
designed to require prompt disclosure of material information to investors
"in order to maintain fair and honest securities markets." 3 Through the
exercise of judicial creativity, the scope of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act4 and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) 5 have been regularly expanded since their adoption. Although
the former purchased the shares of the latter without first revealing that the government
had offered to purchase the corporation's assets at a price that would greatly increase
the value of its shares. The Court held that even though there would normally be
no fiduciary duty in such a situation, the "special facts" in possession of the majority
shareholder gave rise to a duty to disclose those facts. Accordingly, except in those
situations involving "special facts" courts generally adhered to the principle that no
fiduciary duty was owed by insiders in security transactions.
2 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964). Even through section 10(b) was intended to close a gap
relating to fraud in the purchase and sale of securities, there is virtually nothing in the
legislative history of the Act to indicate that Congress intended that a defrauded
purchaser or seller would have a private remedy. In fact, if read literally, the securities
laws are so structured as to suggest that defrauded purchasers and sellers were to be
restricted to the express remedies of the Act.
Despite the emphasis on the legislative history of the Act relating to markets, trading
and disclosure, it would be fallacious to assume that Congress had concern only for
prospective purchasers and sellers, but not for the shareholders. Examples of this
concern are manifested in such areas as proxy regulation and in section 16(b) which
provides for a derivative action to recover on behalf of the corporation short-selling
profits realized by corporate insiders. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964).
3 The House Committee that reported the bill which became the 1934 Act observed
that "no investor . . . can safely buy and sell securities upon exchange without having
an intelligent basis for forming his judgement as to the value of the securities he buys
or sells." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
4 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) to use or employ, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or de-
ceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964).
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970). Pursuant to the authority granted, the SEC prom-
ulgated Rule 10b-5 which is expansive in its scope and provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
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neither Congress nor the SEC had expressly provided private remedies for
violations, the federal courts implied such a remedy.' Furthermore, the
SEC has supported the positions of minority purchasers and sellers as amicus
in the litigated cases advocating a liberal application of the rule.
DEVELOPMENT OF TIPPER-TIPPEE LiAILrrY
Section 10(b) of the Act, and Rule lOb-57 sought to deter that expand-
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.6 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (ED. Pa. 1946). While neither
10(b) nor lob-5 expressly provides for a private remedy for violation, the federal
courts have provided such a remedy. Four years after the adoption of lob-5 it was
held in Kardon that a person harmed by a violation of the Rule had an implied
federal right of action for damages. Since Kardon, each of the federal circuits either
directly or by implication has recognized a private right of action to enforce Rule
lob-5. See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965);
A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co.,
292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961); Beury v. Beury, 222 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955); Hooper v.
Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814
(1961); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Kohler v.
Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d
783 (8th Cir. 1967); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Doelle v. Ireco
Chemicals Co., 391 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1968).
In case after case, barriers to the scope of Rule lob-5 have either been sharply limited
or have disappeared entirely. While not involving 10(b), in the first case to reach
the Supreme Court under the 1934 Act, it was held that a shareholder could assert
the corporation's right for the violation of 14(a) and that "federal courts have the
power to grant all necessary remedial relief." The thrust of the federal decisions is
toward providing civil redress to a defrauded claimant. Furthermore, lob-5 claimants
have not been subjected to rigid adherence to the common law elements of fraud; and
courts to varying degrees, have modified or abandoned such traditional requirements as
privity, scienter and reliance. See J. I. Case Co. v. Boark, 377 U.S. 426, 435 (1964);
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco,
Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); Stevens v. Vowel, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965);
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir.
1956); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Reynolds v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970); Drake v. Thor Power Tool
Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966);
Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A.,
Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp.
972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); New Park Mining Co., v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (SD.N.Y.
1963); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Cochran v.
Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v.
Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, sub non.
Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); H. L. Green Co.
v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp.
808 (D. Del. 1951).
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
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ing category of deceptive practices falling within its broad definition of fraud
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Paramount among
the forbidden fraudulent practices is a corporate insider's failure to disclose
material facts in connection with his sale or purchase. However, the concept
of the corporate insider is no longer limited to the "traditional" insiders-
officers, directors and major shareholders. It now encompasses those select
purchasers and sellers who receive advance material information from inside
sources-'"tippees."'
Tipping is defined as "the selective disclosure of material inside (non-
public) information for trading or other personal purposes." ' The first
indication that a "tippee" would be liable for a violation of lOb-5 was
advanced in a disciplinary proceeding by the SEC. In In re Cady, Roberts,10
a partner in a brokerage house, who was advised by a fellow employee on
the board of directors that his corporation was planning to reduce its divi-
dend, was held to be an insider, and therefore under a duty to disclose
this information before trading in the corporation's stock because his was
a relationship giving access to material facts.
In Ross v. Licht,1 five directors, officers and large shareholders joined
with friends to purchase the outstanding stock of the corporation and then
issue new shares to the public at a higher price. The three friends-
"tippees"-were held liable along with the others as insiders. The court
gave considerable attention to the close relationship between the "tippees"
and the managers of the corporation as well as the fact that the "tippees"
actively participated in the scheme that was withheld from the shareholders.
While the court based its holding primarily on breach of trust, it remarked
that the mere fact that the "tippees" were given information would be
sufficient to create liability for trading on it.
Recent occurrences have imposed liability on the "tipper" as well as on
the "tippee." The SEC found that the brokerage firm of Merrill Lynch,
8See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); A. BROMBERG,
SECURITrS LAW: FRAuD-SEC RULE lob-5, 180-81 (1968); Kennedy & Wander, Texas
Gulf Sulfur, A Most Unusual Case, 20 Bus. LAw 1057, 1064-65 (1965). See generally
Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951).
9 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAw: FRAuD-SEC RULE 10b-5, § 7.5 (2), at 190.7 (1967).
10 In re Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). The Commission stated that
[alnalytically, the obligation of insiders rests on two principal elements; first, the
existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom
he is dealing. Id. at 912.
11263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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Pierce, Fenner and Smith, while underwriting a new issue for Douglas
Aircraft, had violated 10b-5 by tipping material information (a drop in
earnings) to several favored institutional customers, while concealing the
information from other customers. 2 However, the first holding that ex-
plicitly regarded tipping as a violation of lOb-5 was SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulfur.3 Six "tippees" purchased stock prior to the official announcement
of the now famous ore discovery. The court imposed vicarious responsibility
on the "tipper" for the trades of the "tippees". 4 The court gave no express
reason for its holding that tipping constitutes a violation. However, this
result is implicit in the court's condemnation of inside trading, its lengthy
discussion of "connection" and materiality, its policy emphasis of equal
access of all investors to material information,"5 and its purpose of elimina-
tion of informational unequalities in the market." While the "tippees" were
not made defendants in Texas Gulf Sulfur and no concrete rules were enun-
ciated with respect to their conduct, the court clearly indicated that their
conduct was as equally "reprehensible" '1 as that of the "tippers."
While the trend is toward placing the "tipper" and "tippee" within the
ambit of lOb-5, it is always essential that all of the fundamental require-
ments of the Rule must be met before there can be any recovery. Further-
more, it should be obvious that not all information received constitutes a
tip of the type that falls within the scope of the Rule. On one hand, there
could be a valid corporate purpose surrounding the disclosure of informa-
tion; while, on the other, the information so disclosed could be of such a
general nature as not to be considered material. It would appear that
trading by the "tippee" would be necessary under the reasoning of Texas
Gulf Sulphur." This should not be the standard as the giving of the tips
can create a virtual unending chain of subsequent "tippees." The "relation-
ship giving access" test to material undisclosed information as suggested in
Cady, Roberts'9 appears to be the best criteria at this time for deducing
121I1re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8459 (Nov. 25, 1968).
13401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
14 Id. at 856 n. 23.
15 Id. at 848, 849.
l6 Id. at 858.
17Id. at 853.
18 Id. at 850-852 and 858. However, in SEC v. Glen Alden Corp., CCH, SECtUITMS L.
REP., 92,280 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1968), a consent injunction was issued preventing
the dissemination of information to "any selected persons."
19 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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liability, as it provides a clearer and more easily construed standard for
deterring such conduct.
DEFENSES OF TIPPER TO TIPPEE
In sharp contrast to what appears to be the basic trend of extending the
penalties for the misuse of inside information is a recent fifth circuit decision
that appears to detract from some of the previous decisions regarding "tip-
pers" and "tippees." The decision in Kuehnert v. Texstar Corporation01
raises some fundamental questions as to the allocation of responsibilities in
carrying out the objectives of lOb-5.
The Texstar case presented the unusual situation of a "tippee" seeking to
recover losses he had sustained as the result of relying on faulty inside in-
formation supplied to him by a "tipper." The plaintiff through various
dealings with the corporation became friendly with its president. During
the course of this friendship, the president disclosed certain information
that caused the plaintiff to purchase a large number of Texstar shares.
Specifically, the officer revealed that his corporation was planning a
merger and indicated that Texstar's stock would increase in value as a
result of certain "secret" discoveries that had not been announced. He also
told the plaintiff that as president he was having trouble with some of the
other directors and stockholders, and that it was to his advantage to keep
the information secret while he, and hopefully the plaintiff, bought enough
Texstar stock to acquire control of the company.
Acting upon this information, Kuehnert purchased on margin a large
number of Texstar shares on the open market without disclosing the infor-
mation that he had obtained from the president. Later the price declined,
and the representations proved to be false. After the plaintiff's margin
position had been sold out at a substantial loss, he sued his "tipper" and
others under 10b-5 to recover his losses.
The court held that Kuehnert, as a "tippee" who traded on nonpublic
information, was precluded from recovery under the statute and the Rule
because he was in pari delicto and had unclean hands. The court observed
that the two doctrines were based upon public policy and their application
rested within the discretion of the court."'
20 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
21 Id. at 704. At least one court in a 10b-5 action has refused in its discretion to allow
the defense of unclean hands because "it would have further complicated the issues in
an already complicated case." Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242,
[Vol. 5:251
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In an historical sense, the doctrine of in pari delicto had been used to
protect the sanctity of the court where it has been called upon to decide
between two wrongdoers22 and "the doctrine has been applied correctly
or incorrectly in a wide variety of situations." 2 The status of the defense
of in pari delicto is uncertain in actions under blue sky laws24 and Section
12 of the 1933 Act." However, courts have not hesitated to apply it in
proxy cases,2" but have refused to do so in antitrust litigation. The related
defenses of waiver, estoppel, and laches have been held specifically applica-
ble to 10b-5 actions.2" The fifth circuit has previously recognized that in
pari delicto may constitute a defense under 10b-5, but refused to allow
such defense where the only fault attributable to the corporate plaintiff
250 (6th Cir. 1962). See also Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (motion
to strike defenses of in pari delicto and unclean hands in lob-s action denied in dis-
cretion of trial court).
22 McCLuNrocK, PRINCIPLES oF EQurry § 26 (2d ed. 1948).
23 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968).
24 Reilly v. Clyne, 27 Ariz. 432, 234 P. 35 (1925); Taormina v. Antelope Mining
Corp., 110 Cal. App. 2d 314, 242 P.2d 665 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Randall v. California
Land Buyers' Syndicate, 217 Cal. 594, 20 P.2d 331 (1933); Schvaneveldt v. Noy-Bum
Milling & Processing Corp., 10 Utah 2d 1, 347 P.2d 553 (1959). In extreme cases
recovery has been denied. See Miller v. California Roofing Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 136,
130 P.2d 740 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942).
25 The defense of in pari delicto may be applicable to causes of action by an under-
writer. See Slack v. Stiner, 358 F.2d 65, 67-68, 70 (5th Cir. 1966); Can-Am Petroleum
Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1964); Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005,
1011-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Belhumeur v. Dawson, 229 F. Supp. 78, 86-87 (D. Mont. 1964);
Athas v. Day, 186 F. Supp. 385, 389 (D. Colo. 1960).
The in paii delicto doctrine, at least on the basis of the buyer's knowledge of a
violation of Section 12, is so foreign to the purpose of the section that there is hardly
a trace of it in the cases. See Rosenberg v. Hano, 121 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1941);
3 L. Loss, SFcuaRi=s REGuLAnoN, 1694 (1961).26 Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Products Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173, 192 (W.D. Mich.
1966); Gaudiosi v. Franklin, 166 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd and dismissed in
part, sub nom. Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902
(1959). Cf. Union Pacific R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D.
111. 1964) (inequitable to apply doctrine of unclean hands because of peculiar factual
situation).27 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). Cf. Union Leader
Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 586-87 (1st Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).2SRoyal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962). See also
Marth v. Industrial Incomes, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 755, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Hecht v.
Harris, Upham, & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 428 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 F. Supp. 373, 377-78 (S.D. Tex. 1965); 6 L. Loss,
SEcuaTEs REGuLAuTo, 3888-90 (Supp. 1969).
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was the issuance of stock in violation of the registration requirements of the
1933 Act.29
In determining whether it should apply the doctrine of in pari delicto,
the court in Texstar noted that its main problem was the fact that because
Kuehnert knew nothing, he had nothing to conceal, and did not defraud
those from whom he purchased." The court then resolved this dilemma by
reasoning that there was no difference in substance between a successful
fraud and an attempt because the statutory phrase "any manipulative or
deceptive device" 31 was broad enough to cover both situations. This con-
clusion was supported by citing situations where the SEC had been suc-
cessful in enjoining a potential fraud as well as prosecuting a fraud that
failed. 2
In his dissent Judge Godbold observed that neither the statute nor the
Rule provide for the imposition of the doctrine in private 10b-5 litigation
and indicated that it will hinder the private suit as an effective weapon
under lOb-5.33 Making reference to Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Parts Corporation,4 he argued that in the antitrust field, the doctrine
had lost much of its vitality.
In Perma Life, a group of franchisees, who operated Midas Muffler
Shops, brought an action under the Sherman35 and Clayton"0 Acts against
their former franchisor. The plaintiffs alleged that the franchise agreement
requiring that all parts be purchased exclusively from the parent unlawfully
restrained and impeded competition.37 The defendant argued that the
plaintiffs were in pari delicto and, therefore, not entitled to maintain their
suit because each had eagerly and voluntarily sought out and profited from
the very franchises that they were now claiming to be unlawful.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and held
that even though the plaintiffs were not without fault, the doctrine had no
place in antitrust litigation because of the overriding public policy of pro-
29 Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
30 Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969).
3 15 U.S.C. 5 78(j) (b) (1964).
52 Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969).
33 1d. at 705.
34 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
35 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
3815 U.S.C. §§ 13-14 (1964).
57 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 135 (1968).
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moting competition.3" The rationale employed by the Court condemning
the invocation of broad common law barriers to relief where a private suit
serves important public purposes seemed finally to answer the question of
whether this doctrine that had arisen in private suits should be interpreted
narrowly in order to advance public policy. 9 It is unfortunate that the
court in Texstar did not select this logical approach because the doctrine
of in pari delicto is based upon a number of technical and often differing
standards 0 that will only add confusion to and impede the orderly growth
and development of standards designed to insure fair and honest security
markets.
It is equally disturbing to note that the court in Texstar also based its
rejection of Kuenhert's claim by equating his "impure heart" to having
unclean hands.41 Prior to Texstar, there had been only a very limited recog-
nition of the defense of unclean hands in 10(b) and 10b-5 actions.4" The
maxim had been allowed as a defense to a shareholder's derivative suit
involving proxy solicitation. In Gaudiosi v. Franklin,43 the third circuit
qualified the use of the unclean hands defense by observing that the court
"is not bound by formula or restrained by any limitation that tends to
38 In pari delicto has lost such limited vitality as it previously had in the antitrust
area. In rejecting in pari delicto in that field, the Supreme Court said:
We have often indicated the inappropriateness of invoking broad common-law
barriers to relief where a private suit serves important public purposes ....
Both Simpson Iv. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1962)] and Kiefer-Steward [Co. v.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951)] were premised on a recognition that the
purposes of the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action
will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior
in violation of the antitrust laws. The plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble
damages may be no less morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law
encourages his suit to further the overriding public policy in favor of com-
etition. A more fastidious regard for the relative moral worth of the parties
would only result in seously undermining the usefulness of the private action
as a bulwark of antitrust enforcement. And permitting the plaintiff to recover a
windfall gain does not encourage continued violations by those in his position
since they remain fully subject to civil and criminal penalties for their own legal
conduct.
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1968).39 See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Florida
East Coast Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 362 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1966).40 Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 417 F.2d 700, 706 (5th Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
411d. at 703.42 See Cartier v. Dutton, 45 F.R.D. 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (defense of unclean hands
allowed to be pleaded in an action to rescind a sale of stock); Texas Continental Life
Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962) (trial court did not abuse discretion
in refusing to hear matters relaing to defense of unclean hands).
43 166 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd and dismissed in part, sub nom. Gaudiosi v.
Mellon, 269 F.2d 873 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
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trammel the free and just exercise of discretion." 44 More significantly, the
tenth circuit in a case involving the 1933 Securities Act, has held that "an
investor does not waive or lose the shelter of the act because he becomes
to some extent involved in the illegality of the security sales." 4
Virtually any violation of a statute can cause a claimant's hands to be
"unclean," 6 but the maxim had been limited to the requirement that the
unclean hands arise out of the same transaction as the action in litigation.;
Courts have refused to apply the doctrine where it would cause a result
counter to public policy or result in injustice.4" For example, one court was
especially critical of this equitable defense with respect to proxy solicitations:
To apply the maxim in this case would produce the illogic of leaving
the shareholders unprotected when they have been doubly mislead,
stultifying the underlying purpose of the national securities law. Where
a public interest is at stake, above the interests of the parties themselves,
the protection of that paramount interest overcomes the judicial re-
luctance to assist a wrongdoer. 9
The Texstar court further based its denial of relief upon a fear that "[i]f
a tippee can sue he has, in effect, an enforceable warranty that secret infor-
mation is true."5 The majority reasoned that by denying a "tippee" the
right of recovery against a "tipper," the "tippee" will be discouraged from
trading because he must bear the burden of any loss that would be sus-
tained if the information were false.51 However, from a practical standpoint
this type of discouragement will have little effect upon a "tippee" who, pre-
sumably, is a speculator willing to assume certain risks before making his
initial investment. If this is his only discouragement, the "downside" risk
in acting upon a tip would almost always justify the taking of the risk.
The major difficulty with the Texstar reasoning is that it bypasses the
primary purpose of the Act and Rule in dealing with insiders-to protect
44 Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873, 881 (3d Cir. 1959).
45 Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1964).
46 See MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 59, 62 (2d ed. 1948).
-7 National Surety Corp. v. Allen-Codell Co., 70 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Ky. 1947); Ohio
Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1943).48 See McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys Inc., 395 F.2d 230 (10th Cit. 1968);
Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young, 138 F.2d 972 (7th Cit. 1943).
49 Union Pacific R.R. v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400, 410 (ND. Ill.
1964).
50 Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 1969).
51 ld.
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the public by discouraging the private dissemination of material inside
information. As pointed out by Judge Godbold, the basic premise of the
majority in Texstar is that the degree of public interest in private SEC
actions does not compare to that in antitrust litigation. However, the Su-
preme Court in J.1. Case Co. v. Borok 2 while discussing proxy require-
ments stated:
Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supple-
ment to commission action. As in anti-trust treble damage litigation, the
possibility of civil damages or injuctive relief serves as a most effective
weapon in the enforcement of proxy requirements.5 3
The defenses of unclean hands and in pari delicto should be inapplicable
to both private SEC actions (proxy or 10b-5) and antitrust litigation, not
just the latter, because of the equivalent overriding public interest element
present in both areas.
CONCLUSION
Imposing liability upon the insider-"tipper" would not be contrary to
the overall goal of preserving "fair and honest markets""' while "protecting
the ordinary purchaser and seller of securities." 5 5 As the Court in Perma
Life observed, "the plaintiff who reaps the reward of treble damages may
be no less morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law encourages
his suit to further the overriding public policy in favor of competition." 6
Furthermore, in light of the court's language in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the
"tippee" will himself gain no windfall by recovering from his "tipper"
because he will likely be liable to the other parties in the transaction." In
addition, the difficulty of deciding the application of in pari delicto based
upon "badness" makes impossible the creation of an orderly or consistent
body of law on the subject.5" Finally, litigation among reprehensible parties
serves to expose their misconduct and render such conduct more susceptible
to appropriate civil, administrative, and criminal penalties.5 9
52 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
53 Id. at 432.
54 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1964).
55 Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
SOPerma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
57 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 853 (2d Cir. 1968).
58Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 706 n.3 (5th Cir. 1969) (dissenting
opinion).
59 Id.
1971]
262 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The end result in Texstar is that the initial loss is placed upon the "tip-
pee" rather than on the "tipper" where the burden should rest. The insider
who misuses material inside information is the person who should be
punished and discouraged. Policy would better be served by placing the
initial loss on the insider and thereby discourage him from tipping at all.
